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Community Policing from the ‘Bottom-Up’ in Sarajevo Canton 
This article analyses the implementation of a Swiss community policing model 
in Sarajevo Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina. It accounts for how officers from one 
community policing unit were able to facilitate cultural legitimation for their 
community policing role within their sector by linking it to established, 
subcultural definitions of police work. This was achieved through the officers’ 
interactions with colleagues and supervisors as well as their partnership-
building activities in the community. The difficulty experienced by a second 
unit which attempted to replicate their success further indicates that rank-and-
file police officers may also represent an obstacle to ‘bottom-up’ reform. The 
article makes a contribution to a growing body of research on police reform in 
developing and transitional countries by providing empirical support for the 
idea that the agency of enthusiastic and perceptive officers can act as a 
mechanism for cultural transformation. This in-turn may establish a foundation 
for developing contextually appropriate models for locally-responsive policing 
in developing and transitional countries.  
Keywords: community policing; police reform; policy transfer; police culture 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, ‘community policing’ has emerged as a popular template for 
police capacity-building in developing and transitional societies [(see Brogden and Nijhar 
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2005; Ellison 2007)].  Implicit in a growing body of scholarship on transnational policing is a 
recognition of the fact that the policy transfers associated with police reform projects 
constitute complex processes, the outputs of which are shaped by an interplay between 
structure and agency as well as international and local influences [(see Blaustein 2014; 
Ellison and Pino 2012; Ryan 2011)].
 
This article argues that local police officers represent 
important policy mediators who play an important part in determining the nature of policy 
outputs generated by police development assistance projects related to community policing.  
A multi-site, single case study is used to contrast the progress of two community policing 
units working to implement a Swiss community policing model from the ‘bottom-up’ 
[(Marks and Sklansky 2012)] in Sarajevo Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in 2011. 
Motivated police officers from one unit (RPZ1) used their agency to support the initiative by 
facilitating cultural validation of community policing in their sector. This process involved 
linking what Herbert [(2001)] elsewhere identifies as ‘effeminate’ aspects of community 
police work to ‘masculine’ definitions of policing. This enabled members of RPZ1 to retain 
their credentials as police officers while communicating the operational utility of a non-
adversarial policing role to colleagues and supervisors. Subcultural validation had practical 
benefits for the officers from RPZ1. It afforded them operational autonomy and discretion 
which allowed them to devote much of their time to partnership-building activities. The 
officers believed this autonomy was necessary for outwardly improving the perceived 
legitimacy and responsiveness of the Sarajevo Canton Police. 
The success of this unit is then contrasted with the obstacles encountered by a second 
unit, RPZ2.  Officers from RPZ2 struggled to implement the reform in their sector due to a 
combination of contextual obstacles and limited managerial support. Their progress was 
further constrained by the officers’ personal hesitations about embracing what they perceived 
to be a ‘feminised’ policing role. Their primary concern was that doing so would jeopardise 
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their perceived credibility as professional police officers. The second case study therefore 
highlights how the agency of these officers can also limit the prospects for achieving bottom-
up reform. Taken together, the case studies support the argument that even in weak and 
structurally dependent states like BiH, rank-and-file police officers have the capacity to act as 
agents of institutional change. In other words, this agency has the potential to make an 
important contribution to the development of culturally and contextually appropriate models 
for ‘downwardly responsive’ [(Bayley 1999: 7)] or ‘democratically responsive’ policing 
[(Aitchison and Blaustein 2013)].  
The article begins with a methodological discussion. It then proceeds to contextualise 
the case study with a concise review of the history of policing in the Social Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and BiH.  The key components of the Swiss community policing 
model that was introduced to Sarajevo Canton by the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) in 2008 are accounted for and this is followed by a review of the 
challenges associated with achieving cultural transformation of the police. The remainder of 
the article then contrasts the experiences of the two RPZ units.  
 
Methodology 
 
The case study referenced in this article draws from five weeks of qualitative field work 
conducted by the author between March and April 2011 while he was completing his 
doctorate and conducting participant observation as an ‘intern’ with UNDP in BiH’s Safer 
Communities project. The aim of the research was to develop insights into how local police 
officers interpreted community policing and the extent to which they had been successful in 
implementing the reform. The field work was initially carried out to provide empirical 
support for recommendations contained within a UNDP policy brief that outlined the 
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possibility of introducing formal community safety partnership structures Sarajevo Canton. 
Access to conduct the research was negotiated by UNDP and approved by the Ministry of the 
Interior for Sarajevo Canton (MUP KS) in February 2011. The author’s permission to 
reference this data for scholarly publication was established through his Terms of Reference 
agreement with UNDP and research protocol approved by the MUP KS.  
The data was generated using ethnographic methods including four-weeks of 
observation with officers from two community policing units and semi-structured interviews 
conducted in the final week.
i
 Blaustein personally completed over seventy hours of 
observation with the two RPZ units during the first four weeks of the field work. He 
accompanied the officers during their shifts, attended meetings with different ‘partners’ in the 
community and observed their interactions with colleagues and supervisors. He jotted field 
notes in a journal and wrote them up as field notes which were later analysed using open 
coding techniques. The choice of methods was very much determined by the nature of the 
access and the need for flexibility due to the unpredictable schedules of the officers as well as 
that of the author whose time was split between this research and a placement with UNDP.  A 
research assistant acted as a translator and interpreter for the observation with RPZ2. He also 
was present at the semi-structured interviews which were not tape recorded. The research 
assistant’s reflections represent an important source of inter-coder reliability which 
contributed to aspects of the analysis presented in this article. 
RPZ1 and RPZ2 were purposively selected for the study following consultations with 
colleagues at UNDP and the RPZ Coordinator for the Sarajevo Canton Police which revealed 
them to be the most experienced policing units in Sarajevo Canton. This was important 
because it ensured that the officers were already well-versed in the SDC’s model and thus, 
any shortcomings could not be attributed to inexperience. Rather than organising the analysis 
around thematic subheadings that correspond to different factors that are known to obstruct or 
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facilitate the implementation of community policing projects (e.g. lack of motivation, 
contextual obstacles, managerial resistance), the article presents the experiences of both units 
separately in order to illuminate important linkages between these factors.  The identity of the 
officers, their units, and the specific location of their sectors has been obscured. All 
quotations are paraphrased unless explicitly stated. The author did not have a formal working 
relationship with the SDC or any personal interest in the evaluated ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of 
their community policing project. 
A final point to make relates to the issue of generalizability. Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
not a representative example of the categories of developing, transitional, post-conflict or 
weak states. Indeed, representative examples do not exist for these categories. In many 
respects, Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a relatively hospitable environment for reformers. 
This is down to the country’s political and economic stability, at least in comparison to other 
developing and transitional countries in North Africa, the Middle East and parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa. The challenges which confront reformers operating in these environments 
must not be dismissed [(see Hills 2009)] and it must therefore be acknowledged that cultural 
and structural factors ultimately determine the long-term viability of police reform projects 
[(see Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Ellison and Pino 2013)].  
 
Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Policing in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) remains poorly documented 
in the English language policing literature.
ii
 It is clear however that the institution exhibited 
elements of what [Broduer (1983)] has elsewhere described as ‘high’ and ‘low policing’. 
‘High policing’ was evident from the centralised, state policing body known as the ‘Resor 
Državne Bezbednosti’ (RDB). The RDB was responsible for intelligence and counter-
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intelligence activities and was comprised of a paramilitary force of approximately fifteen-
thousand officers who ‘...could be deployed in times of political unrest or disorder when the 
local police were expected to side with the populace against federal authorities’ [(Soper, 
2007)]. This suggests that the RDB primarily worked to insulate the Yugoslav government 
and its political ideology from political dissidence.  By contrast, ‘low policing’ in the SFRY 
was decentralised and administered by each of Yugoslavia’s six individual republics 
following liberalisation initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s [(Stojanovic and Downes 2009: 75-
76)].
iii
  
The fact that each individual republic had a certain degree of control over local 
‘milicija’ (public police) meant that local policing varied throughout the SFRY.  While 
descriptive accounts of low policing within these constituent republics are scarce, anecdotal 
evidence does suggest that its provision was generally viewed more favourably by the 
Yugoslav public than its state-level counterpart. This was at least the case in the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina where [Bringa (1995: 74)] suggests that the local milicija derived a 
certain degree of legitimacy from its capacity to act as a de facto arbitrator of inter-ethnic 
disputes. This is not to suggest however that the institution was highly regarded by the public 
or that members of the public were overly keen to interact with their local police officers. 
This analysis is supported by a 2003 project proposal for DFID’s community-oriented 
policing project which states that neighbourhood policing in the SFRY was characterised by 
‘a lack of trust between police and communities’ [(Atos KPMG 2003: 2)].iv   The possibility 
that the police might be seen as legitimate but lack the public’s trust can be explained by the 
fact that the SFRY was not a liberal-democracy. Rather, their authority was a product of both 
local tradition and the institution’s association with a state that derived its authority from a 
‘party monopoly of truth and representation’ [(quoting Beetham 2013: 21)]. 
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If policing in the SFRY could not be described as ‘democratic’v, its role during the 
Bosnian War was clearly ‘anti-democratic’ [Aitchison and Blaustein 2013]. [Bieber (2010)] 
describes how the collapse of SFRY during the early 1990s prompted the local police to 
redefine their function for the duration of the conflict while [Aitchison (2007: 327-328)] 
observes that between 1992 and 1995, local police officers actively participated in various 
human rights abuses including acts associated with ethnic cleansing, forced population 
transfers, mass detention, and mass murder. The role of the public police during the war and 
its complicity with human rights abuses inevitably tarnished the reputation of this institution 
as a legitimate provider of local security. It also further diminished its operational capacities 
for maintaining general order. It was in relation to the perceived non-democratic character of 
policing in the SFRY and its anti-democratic character during the Bosnian War that 
international reformers identified police reform as an important state-building priority in BiH 
beginning in the late 1990s.  
Significant progress was made by the international community between 1996 and 
2004 in terms of establishing a foundation upon which democratically responsive policing 
could be established [(Aitchison and Blaustein 2013)]. By 2008, multiple community 
policing projects had been introduced to BiH by international organisations intent on 
enhancing the delivery of local police and improving police-community relations. Research 
by [Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić (2011: 180-181)] indicates that most of these initiatives, 
particularly those which attempted to promote a ‘philosophy’ of community policing at the 
macro- or institutional levels, failed to have a discernible impact on the actual mentalities and 
practices of rank-and-file officers. Specifically, [Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić] found that by 2008, 
most uniformed patrol officers interviewed were aware of the rhetoric of community policing 
but struggled to distinguish it from the ‘traditional’ Yugoslav model of sector-based patrol. 
Similar views were expressed during interviews conducted by Blaustein with project workers 
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and external evaluators contracted by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) in 2011 (interviews, SDC project associate and external evaluator). These sources 
indicate that multiple attempts to implement community policing reforms from the ‘top-
down’ had failed to have a significant impact on how rank-and-file police officers throughout 
BiH constructed their professional identity. 
 
Community Policing: The Swiss Way 
 
 Unlike its predecessors, the SDC aspired to promote a micro-level community policing 
model that defined community police work as a specialist activity to be carried out by 
designated community policing specialists assigned to dedicated ‘RPZ’ units. Between 2008 
and 2011, the SDC supported the Ministry of the Interior for Sarajevo Canton in introducing 
RPZ units to different sectors. It provided the officers assigned to these units with training 
that was modelled on what the SDC identified as the ‘best practices’ of community policing 
in Switzerland. This training introduced the officers to four components of community 
policing: ‘security marketing’, ‘intelligence sharing’, ‘transactional analysis’ and 
‘partnership-building’. The SDC describes these components in its 2010 Manual for 
Community-Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina which also features input from local RPZ 
officers from across BiH who were involved with early implementation efforts [(SDC 2010; 
henceforth ‘Manual’)]. The terminology employed by the SDC was ultimately adopted by 
local RPZ officers throughout Sarajevo Canton who used it to structure and interpret their 
work. This section reviews its four key components and links them with recognisable aspects 
of community police work from the United States and Western Europe. 
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Security Marketing 
 
‘Security marketing’ was introduced as a problem-solving methodology conducive to what 
[Goldstein (1979: 236)] has elsewhere labelled ‘problem-oriented policing’.  The Manual lists 
six steps for ‘achieving a security marketing process’: ‘find out the causes of insecurity of the 
population’; ‘identif[y] the problem’; analyse the problem; ‘searching for partners in order to 
find an efficient solution to the problem’; ‘[find] a solution to the problem, together with 
partners’; and ‘evaluate’ results [(SDC 2010: 65-67)]. Elements of the ‘security marketing 
process’ are quite similar to the  ‘SARA’ methodology (‘Scanning’, ‘Analysis’, ‘Response’ 
and ‘Assessment’) that is commonly used by community police officers in Europe and North 
America. The difference between the two approaches, at least according to the Manual, is 
that ‘security marketing’ provides community policing specialists with a toolkit for 
addressing ‘complex security problems’ whereas SARA is to be used by the officers to 
‘[solve] local problems of lower intensity’ (SDC 2010: 81).  The Manual does not actually 
distinguish between ‘complex security problems’ and ‘problems of lower intensity’ so it is 
safe to assume that this was left to the judgment of RPZ officers. 
 
Intelligence Sharing 
 
‘Intelligence sharing’ reflects the idea of community policing as a form of knowledge work 
used to communicate risk to internal and external stakeholders [(see Ericsson and Haggerty 
1997)].To this effect, the Manual prescribes that RPZ teams should take the lead in 
presenting the local intelligence gathered via ‘security marketing’ to colleagues throughout 
the organisation and to partners in the community [(SDC 2010: 56)]. To perform this 
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‘intelligence sharing’ function within the police organisation, the Manual states officers 
should maintain an ‘affairs board’ within their station that lists recent incidents and events 
and that the officers present their analyses of these findings to their colleagues during daily 
briefings [(SDC 2010: 54)]. It also suggests that community policing specialists should work 
directly with station managers and supervisors to streamline communications and by-pass 
hierarchical reporting procedures that restrict the flow of information within this 
organisational setting. To perform this intelligence sharing function with partners in the 
community, the Manual calls for RPZ specialists to ‘know their area/sector of responsibility 
and the citizens living there’ [(SDC 2010: 39)] so that they can establish a functional network 
of partners throughout the community. Specifically, the Manual states: 
 
‘Community policing officers should contact all citizens, whatever their social status, origin, 
culture and lifestyle might be. They should also partner with other stakeholders, mainly 
from the social and educational areas which requires (sic) good knowledge of 
stakeholders…Community policing officers will be asked various questions, which will not 
always be related to their scope of competences, but anyhow the attitude of service to the 
population should be a guide. [RPZ] officers will make efforts to find solutions, resorting to 
the partners’ competences and services.’ [(SDC 2010: 46)] 
 
Theorising the significance of intelligence-led community policing in the Canadian context, 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 70-71, 73) reference the work of Stenson (1993) in arguing that 
community policing constitutes a particularly important ‘institutional methodology for 
communicating risk management’ that ‘constitutes the police as professional experts… [who 
possess]…abstract knowledge about risk that is valuable to others’. This idea is implicit in 
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the SDC’s belief that appealing to community values and interests through positive, non-
adversarial interactions is particularly important for establishing police legitimacy and re-
affirming the traditional role of the public police as an important institution for risk 
communication in the community. Establishing a network of contacts is also important in 
relation to this idea of policing as risk communication because it seeks to develop what 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 72) identify as ‘[improved] connections with the 
communications circuitry of other risk institutions’. 
 
Transactional Analysis 
 
The third element of the SDC’s community policing model was derived from Canadian 
psychiatrist Eric Berne’s (1959/1996; 1961) theory of ‘transactional analysis’. In an article 
published in the Indian Journal of Psychiatry in 1959, Berne (1959/1996: 154-155) describes 
transactional analysis as follows: 
 
 ‘’The system is based on the observation that psychic functioning and social behavior are 
related to states of mind which may be called ego states. An ego state may be described 
phenomenologically  as a coherent system of feelings, and operationally as a set of coherent 
behavior patterns; or pragmatically, as a system of feelings which motivates a related set of 
behaviour patterns. It can be further observed that there are three types of ego stages, each 
derived from a psychic organ: exteropsychic, neopsychic, and archaeopsychic…. After 
patients (or therapists) become somewhat adept at diagnosing between exteropsychic, 
neopsychic, and archaeopsychic ego states, they may proceed to simple transactional 
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analysis. The problem here is to distinguish direct transactions from complex transaction. 
The latter are of two kinds: crossed and ulterior.’  
 
Research on transactional analysis has evolved since the late 1950s but the fundamental idea 
is that it provides individuals with a schema and vocabulary that supports continuous 
reflection about how different psychological influences shape their social interactions. The 
‘theory’ posits that individuals can use this reflective process to understand and improve the 
quality of their communication and relationships with others. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to consider the merits and limitations of transactional analysis but it is worth 
accounting for how the idea was interpreted by the SDC and why it was prescribed as a 
method for achieving a ‘security marketing process’ in Sarajevo Canton. Essentially, the SDC 
viewed transactional analysis as a means of enabling and encouraging rank-and-file police 
officers to take the initiative of working to improve their relationship with different segments 
of the community and it was thought that this would improve the prospect of inter-agency 
cooperation. According to the SDC’s website, ‘more than 10,000 employees of police 
agencies’ undertook training in transactional analysis which was delivered by ‘100 trainers’ 
between 2006 and 2010 (see ‘SDC Bosnia and Herzegovina…’).   I did not personally have 
the opportunity to observe or take part in the SDC’s transactional analysis training so it is not 
clear from this research which specific elements of Berne’s (1961) ‘system’ were being 
utilised by the officers. What was clear from my observation was that officers from RPZ1 
frequently made reference to the rhetoric of ‘transactional analysis’ while performing 
community police work and they appeared to embrace it as a valuable resource for 
interpreting their approach to nurturing trust in the community.  This was particularly evident 
in relation to their role in implementing a youth outreach programme developed by the SDC 
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called ‘Civilian Courage’. By contrast, the officers from RPZ2 demonstrated less awareness 
and enthusiasm for transactional analysis despite having completed the same training as their 
counterparts from RPZ.  
 
Partnership-building 
 
A final element of the SDC’s model is linked with the previous three: ‘partnership-building’. 
The Manual states: 
 
‘In this partnership model the police are one of the stakeholders in solving local problems, 
and do not have a professional problem-solving monopoly. Therefore, the police do not 
consider it has exclusive competence, it sees itself as a partner. All partners must assume 
their roles in their respective fields of competence. The correlation of various field of 
competence helps identify sustainable solutions.’  [(SDC 2010: 29)] 
 
The discourse evoked in the Manual are very similar to those associated with community-
based policing models across Western Europe, specifically, the cliché that ‘the police can’t 
do it alone’. In England and Wales for example, Crawford [(1999: 56)] describes how in the 
1990s, ‘…a growing body of opinion both in in academic and government circles…endorsed 
the need for greater multi-agency ‘co-operation’ primarily at the local level, as providing the 
modest effective means of policy formation and service delivery’. From the SDC’s 
perspective, the appeal of these discourses was linked with the agency’s belief that many 
police officers in BiH continued to resist the idea of taking on a broadened mandate. 
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Embracing new roles and responsibilities was considered by the SDC to be a prerequisite for 
addressing mundane yet complex public safety issues that fell beyond the traditional police 
remit. Visibly responding to issues like the city’s stray dog population and poor street 
lighting was also thought to represent an important means by which the Sarajevo Canton 
Police could bolster its perceived legitimacy and establish a more collaborative approach to 
policing.  
 
‘Bottom-Up’ Reform  
 
To facilitate the implementation of this model, the SDC adopted what has elsewhere been 
identified as a ‘bottom-up’ approach to police reform [(see Marks and Sklansky 2012)]. In 
other words, the SDC project team embraced the agency of these low ranking officers as a 
potential asset for overcoming the organisational resistance that had undermined earlier 
community policing initiatives. The idea was that the specialists from the RPZ units would 
use the SDC’s methods to demonstrate the utility of community policing to colleagues and 
supervisors. This was believed to be necessary for promoting cultural acceptance of the 
model within the Sarajevo Canton Police (interview, SDC project associate).  To situate the 
obstacles confronting the SDC, this section accounts for the challenges associated with the 
implementation of community policing reforms in modern, bureaucratic police organisations, 
namely cultural resistance. It then draws from the work of Chan [(1996)] and Marks [(2000; 
2005)] to suggest that rank-and-file police officers have an important role to play in 
facilitating cultural transformation within this organisation.  Accordingly, their agency is 
argued to represent an important resource to reformers working to facilitate the development 
of service-oriented policing models in developing and transitional countries l like BiH. 
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  MacKenzie and Henry (2009: 31) argue that when it comes to community policing, 
‘implementation failure is so common as to largely neutralise the capacity of researchers to 
say whether CP would ‘work’ if its concept(s) ever were to make a flawless transition into 
practice.’ In liberal democracies, subcultural resistance to community policing by the rank-
and-file has been linked with the idea that the model is perceived as conflicting with a 
romanticised ethos of police work [(Herbert 2001: 64)]. This ethos is shaped by institutional 
discourses that emphasise ‘danger and authority’ [(Skolnick 1966)], ‘violence’ [(Loftus 2009: 
96-99)], and ‘masculinity’ [(Herbert 2001: 57-59)].vi  The activities and the values associated 
with community policing are often viewed by the rank-and-file as a threat to their authority 
because they aspire to establish ‘a more conciliatory, nonaggressive style of policing’ 
[(Miller 1999: 197 quoted by Herbert 2001: 64)]. In other words, community policing 
challenges the assumption that the police possess a unique ability to administer coercion and 
control crime through its aspiration to reduce the social distance between the police and 
members of the public [(Herbert 2001: 64)]. This implies the creation of a model of policing 
whereby ‘everyday definitions of neighborhoods developed by residents’ are no longer 
‘rendered subordinate to the demands of apprehending dangerous suspects’ but rather, 
accorded ‘dominant’ status in relation to the process of negotiating orders [(Herbert 2001: 
64)].
vii
   
The degree and manifestations of organisational resistance to community policing 
reforms will inevitably vary due to cultural differences between police organisations 
operating in different contexts and structural differences relating to the socially defined 
functions of the police.  [Reiner (2010: 136)] acknowledges that significant cultural 
differences in fact exist between organisations within countries yet argues ‘certain 
commonalities in cop culture…arise from the police role in liberal democracies’. These 
commonalities reflect the fact that all police organisations in liberal democratic societies 
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share a ‘fundamental remit to control crime and disorder in unequal, divided societies while 
adhering to principles of the rule of law’ [(Reiner 2010: 137)]. Accordingly, [Bowling and 
Sheptycki (2012: 82)] identify a set of universal ‘parameters’ that structure police subculture 
in different jurisdictions. These include: ‘the ability to use coercion to ‘get the job done’’; 
recognition that ‘[i]nformation is considered the ‘life-blood’ of policing’; ‘the role that law 
plays as part of the tools of the trade, and the double-edged qualities of counter-law’; 
‘modern police management’; ‘the political framing of policing; ‘masculinity’; ‘racism’; 
and…the ‘danger-authority nexus’. Many of these parameters appear to be consistent with the 
hyper masculine values that are argued by [Herbert (2001)] to have underpinned subcultural 
resistance to community policing in the United States. The implication is that regardless of 
context, the philosophical embrace of community policing by senior managers regularly fails 
to translate into concrete changes in terms of street-level policing activities or changes in how 
rank-and-file police officers construct their professional identity in established and aspiring 
democratic societies alike (see Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Frűhling 2007; Weisburd et al 
2002). 
Additional factors that may impede upon the implementation process include:  a lack 
of resources; challenges associated with measuring the performance of community police 
officers and demonstrating its strategic value in a performance management regime; and of 
course, obstacles that arise from exogenous factors [(see Mastrofski et al)].
viii
 The issues of 
limited resources and measuring performance are linked with the issue of cultural acceptance 
because police managers who do not appreciate the strategic utility of community policing 
are unlikely to resource or staff it adequately. It is worth reiterating that these obstacles may 
present themselves differently in different contexts but it is reasonable to assume that 
implementation challenges which stem from limited resources and a lack of external support 
for partnership-based policing activities may be greater in developing and transitional 
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countries [(see for example Deosaran 2002; Ryan 2007)]. In fact, [Brogden (2005: 88)] goes 
so far as to argue that in some developing contexts, namely those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
‘[community policing], as designed in the West, is simply largely irrelevant…not simply a 
product of ineffective implementation’. Indeed, a lack of cultural resonance represents a 
substantial barrier to implementation but it also raises important questions about the 
appropriateness of the model to begin with. 
Despite these obstacles, the policing literature indicates that change is possible. 
Assuming that the changes in question are culturally and contextually appropriate, the 
prospect of ‘successfully’ implementing a model is enhanced when members of the police 
organisation wilfully incorporate its elements into established cultural definitions of their 
work. The fact that ‘cop culture’ is mutable and continuously shaped by a combination of 
individual, institutional and structural factors [(Chan 1997)] allows for this possibility 
assuming that capable and motivated agents are available to initiate the change. According to 
[Chan (1996: 112)], this implies that ‘a sound theory of police culture should recognize the 
interpretive and active role of officers in structuring their understanding of the organization 
and its environment’.  
For change to occur, members of the occupational culture must accept the proposed 
changes and use their agency to align them with existing subcultural values. This requires 
two things: the ability of officers to alter subcultural definitions of police work and their 
motivation to do so. The ability of rank-and-file police officers to act as ‘agents of change’ is 
linked with what [Bayley (2012: 22)] identifies as their ‘craft knowledge’, that is, their 
‘understanding of the tactics needed to achieve control, justice, amelioration, and legitimacy 
in daily encounters with the public’. It is also a product of their cultural knowledge and social 
capital within the organisation. For example, [Manning (1977)] describes how police officers 
regularly utilise impression management techniques to shape their interactions with 
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colleagues and supervisors. These interactions are necessary for visibly asserting their 
commitment to shared institutional values and they allow police officers to continuously 
reaffirm their professional identity. Interactions with internal and external audiences provide 
police officers with ‘a thorough, nuanced understanding of their fellow officers’ which is 
necessary for developing creative strategies for promoting acceptance of non-traditional 
policing strategies and tactics [(Marks and Sklansky 2012: 6)]. Their membership in the 
organisation and their impression management skills together represent an important source 
of professional capital within the police organisation. If it is utilised strategically, this capital 
may allow motivated officers to negotiate their roles by reconstructing their professional 
identity. Over time, acceptance of these modified roles may support broader institutional 
changes with respect to the values and norms associated with police work. To this effect, 
Goldsmith (original emphasis 1990: 91) has argued that we can embrace police discretion as 
‘a potential resource in the formulation of rules governing police powers and practices’. 
Marks’s [(2000; 2005)] research on police reform in South Africa illustrates this possibility 
by describing the possibility of generating institutional support for police reforms from the 
‘bottom-up’. [Marks (2000: 558)] writes: 
 
‘…internal resistance or challenge is one of the most effective and direct mechanisms for 
bringing about change in policing agencies, but that for this challenge to be successful, a 
commitment, on the part of the police agency itself, to a change in the formal rules of 
policing must be evident.’ 
 
As evident from the experiences of RPZ1 and RPZ2, the agency of rank-and-file can at best 
be described as a potential resource for change because the motivation for officers to assume 
the role of change agents is not always present. Motivation may be intrinsic, extrinsic, or a 
combination of the two. In other words, individual officers may voluntarily embrace 
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community policing because they accept its purported benefits or, they may feel compelled to 
implement it at the behest of their managers.  In Sarajevo Canton, enthusiasm for community 
policing was inconsistent amongst RPZ specialists and police managers alike. As the case 
study demonstrates, managerial support,  
 
RPZ1 
RPZ1 consisted of four, full-time officers including two young male officers with 
undergraduate degrees, a young female officer and veteran male officer who had previously 
lectured on the topic of community policing at the Sarajevo Canton Police Academy.
ix
 The 
educational attainment of the officers from RPZ1 was a major factor in their willingness to 
embrace the model and it also informed their recognition of the importance of generating 
trust between the police and members of the public. For nearly three years, the officers from 
RPZ1 had proactively worked to promote the SDC’s model for community policing. They did 
so by initiating regular, informal encounters with members of the public and local 
organisations in their sector. These interactions were used to generate publicity for their role 
and to attract external support for the idea of partnership. The officers from RPZ1 were 
initially effective in using these relationships to identify local public safety issues that 
affected local citizens but they struggled to actually develop ‘holistic’ solutions to address 
complex problems like stray dogs or inadequate street lighting. According to the officers, the 
municipal agencies responsible for addressing these issues frequently refused to recognise the 
authority of police officers to intervene in matters that traditionally lay beyond the remit of 
police work (personal communication, RPZ1). Similar accounts of bureaucratic inertia and 
institutional resistance to partnership-based community policing models are documented 
extensively in Anglo-American [(for example Crawford 1999: 107-108; Greene 2004)] and 
Western European [Terpstra 2008: 219)] policing literatures. 
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The officers from RPZ1 recognised that achieving public recognition for their 
expanded policing mandate and generating enthusiasm for the concept of partnership-based 
policing would take time (personal communication, RPZ1). They also appreciated that 
important contextual differences existed between BiH and Switzerland. One of the officers 
observed that from his perspective, “[community policing] is a very good idea in terms of 
relationships and partnerships and building high levels of trust but the way we get there is not 
the same” (personal communication, RPZ1). This sentiment was also voiced by members of a 
newly established RPZ unit operating on the outskirts of the city (personal communication, 
RPZ4).
x
  
While the officers recognised the need for patience, they also acknowledged that their 
lack of demonstrable short term ‘results’ initially jeopardised the long term sustainability of 
their ‘specialist’ role and the autonomy it afforded them. Specifically, one of the officers 
from RPZ1 described how the unit’s early inability to achieve results using the ‘security 
marketing’ methodology fuelled cynicism from patrol-based colleagues who appeared to be 
resentful of the unstructured and improvisational nature of community police work (personal 
communication, RPZ1). This problem was particularly evident in relation to what the officers 
determined to be an important intelligence sharing ritual: drinking coffee with local residents. 
One of the officers described how “when we go and drink coffee at a shopping centre, we are 
also doing work, gathering intelligence, meeting with the manager” but added that this was 
potentially controversial because “the other officers don’t see this” (personal communication, 
RPZ1).  
It was even more crucial that the officers retained the support of senior managers, 
specifically the Sector Chief who, as one of the RPZ officers noted, “makes all the station’s 
strategic decisions so if he doesn’t care about [community policing] or know about 
[community policing], it won’t work” (personal communication, RPZ1). Without the support 
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of this individual, the officers anticipated that they would be denied the privilege of defining 
their own operational priorities which allowed them to attend community meetings at which 
local residents would voice their concerns about various public safety issues. One of the 
officers described the importance of maintaining their flexible working schedule.  
 
…meetings take place between 18:00 and 19:00…Normally we work from 7:30 to 16:00 
however there are 27 [local community centres] in [the sector] and 6-7 meetings take place 
each month. We try to go to all of them because attendance is part of the trust building 
exercise. If they see you are interested when there is not a problem, this will build trust. You 
must always go through, not just when you need something.  (personal communication, 
RPZ1)xi 
 
Along these lines, the officer added that “if the Chief is made to recognise the benefits of 
[community policing] as a problem-solving tool, he will facilitate it” (personal 
communication, RPZ1).
xii
 In other words, the officers from RPZ1 recognised that it was up to 
them to carve out a cultural space for their prescribed role as well as to sustain managerial 
support for it. Unable to initially present their colleagues and supervisors with an immediate 
sense of the tangible benefits of partnership-building, the officers accepted that they would 
need to identify other ways to convey the strategic value of security marketing.  In other 
words, they recognised that they needed to use their craft knowledge to construct a 
favourable definition for community policing that would appear to complement culturally 
entrenched definitions of police work rather than threaten them. This was achieved by 
emphasising the benefits of their intelligence sharing role through their interactions with 
colleagues and supervisors.  
To this effect, the officers from  RPZ1 assumed responsibility for managing the 
sector’s crime map and drew from their growing network of ‘partners’ to generate what they 
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described as ‘intelligence’ on criminal activity in the sector.  One of the officers described 
how the unit used its ‘security marketing’ methodology to understand why bet shopsxiii were 
being disproportionally targeted. They determined that bet shops represented attractive 
targets because they regularly held up to 30,000 KM
xiv
 in cash on site and the owners refused 
to hire security guards or invest in preventative technologies because the money was insured. 
The officer added that previously, lottery shops represented ideal targets until the Canton 
introduced legislation requiring the owners to employ armed security guards as a condition of 
their licence. Subsequently, the officer explained that the sector had only experienced one 
recorded incident of an armed robbery at a lottery shop in the past year. The political 
connections of the bet shop owners gave the officer little reason to believe that the politicians 
from the Canton would develop similar legislation to increase security. However, they were 
nonetheless able to use this intelligence sharing role to identify high risk locations (i.e. 
‘hotspots’) and feed this information to Shift Commanders who would strategically deploy 
uniformed and plain clothes officers at and around these ‘problem areas’ (field notes).  
The unit’s ability to translate its work into culturally acceptable practices clearly 
benefitted from the social capital that the officers had accumulated through their on-going 
partnership building activities. They also drew on these connections to support criminal 
investigations. This was observed in the aftermath of an aborted bank robbery that occurred 
approximately 200 meters from the police station where I sat drinking coffee with the officers 
during my second day of observation with RPZ1. The officers’ decision to respond to the call 
enabled them to communicate their solidarity with their colleagues in patrol and the 
investigators called to the scene. It therefore served to reaffirm their professional identity as 
police officers by outwardly emphasising the masculine attributes of their interpretation of 
community police work. This use of impression management was important because it 
allowed them to reassert their professional credibility as police officers.  
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 The subsequent investigation of the incident also provided the officers with an 
opportunity to show off their unique ‘intelligence sharing’ abilities and thus, express the 
utility of what was perceived by their colleagues to represent a more feminised approach to 
policing as an adjunct to traditional response-based policing activities.
xv
 Throughout the day, 
the officers placed calls to various contacts to solicit information about the incident.  Hours 
later, one of the officers received a phone call on their personal mobile phone from a local 
shop keeper who confirmed the identity of the suspect (field notes). The following morning, a 
different officer from RPZ1 explained that based on this tip, the unit filed an anonymous 
report with the criminal investigation unit and an arrest was imminent. Asked how the unit 
was able to obtain the suspect’s identity so easily, the officer explained that the informant 
knew the officers and trusted that they would “keep their identity secret” (personal 
communication, RPZ1). Implicit in this response was the officer’s belief that members of the 
public also viewed the officers from RPZ1 as being distinct from their ‘traditional’ rank-and-
file counterpart and thus, more approachable. Interestingly, the ‘feminine’ scripts for 
community policing being implemented by the officers from RPZ1 appeared to enhance their 
professional identity and legitimate authority in the eyes of the public rather than diminish it. 
While the officer’s comment does not alone provide a sufficient empirical basis for 
determining whether or not the public actually ‘trusted’ the officers from RPZ1, it does 
highlight the fact that the officers were comfortable with dissociating themselves from 
traditional police roles for strategic reasons.  Their rank-and-file colleagues were aware of 
their flexibility and appeared to be willing to accept it. 
RPZ1 was also successful in translating its script for ‘transactional analysis’ into 
intelligence sharing practices that enhanced the department’s capacity to respond to what the 
sector chief identified as a growing  problem in the sector:  youth anti-social behaviour. One 
of the officers from RPZ1 described how the sector chief directed the unit to focus its energy 
24 
 
on local schools because they felt that their problems could not be adequately addressed 
through the traditional patrol-based model of policing (personal communication, RPZ1). 
RPZ1 responded enthusiastically to the chief’s request because the unit was already engaging 
with the sector’s youth through its efforts to implement the SDC’s ‘Civilian Courage’ 
curriculum in local schools. One of the officers reflected on the linkage between the values of 
active citizenship inherent to this curriculum and the problem of youth anti-social behaviour 
in suggesting that: 
 
“…youth issues are one of the most significant problems in Sarajevo given that parents 
continue to subscribe to this mentality that denies their own responsibility…they are not 
adapted to the democratic values which require active citizenship … parents continue to tell 
their kids to ignore social problems as they do not feel it is their responsibility but the 
state’s…” (personal communication, officer from RPZ1) 
 
The officers used their school visits to meet with school directors and to learn about 
the problems experienced by individual students. To promote the idea of partnership between 
the police and schools, the officers provided school administrators with their personal contact 
details and instructed them to call them “at any time” to schedule follow-up on the officers’ 
progress, report new incidents or request police assistance (personal communication, RPZ1). 
Whenever an issue was brought to their attention, the officers claimed that they used their 
security marketing methodology to analyse the problem. They would then identify an 
appropriate solution that frequently required the officers to draw from their network of 
partners and initiate a multi-agency response. For example, one of the officers confronted the 
sector’s municipality office about inadequate street lighting based on a complaint from a 
school director. Another officer contacted a representative of social services to investigate 
allegations of child abuse (field notes). Whenever the unit managed to resolve an issue, it 
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openly attributed its success to cooperation and partnership-working. These interactions were 
essential for according ‘dominant status’ to the ‘everyday definitions of neighborhoods 
developed by residents’ [(Herbert 2001: 64)].  
Within the police organisation, these interactions also enabled the unit to take credit 
for improving the department’s capacity to generate strategic intelligence relating to on-going 
issues such as low level drug dealing in the vicinity of schools and organised fights between 
gangs of students from different sectors. The officers relayed this information directly to the 
sector chief who used it to adjust the sector’s policing strategy or raise the issue with local 
policy makers if it warranted a policy response (field notes). One of the officers from RPZ1 
elaborated on the strategic advantages of establishing this direct communication link with the 
chief. This took place in the aftermath of a community meeting that was organised in 
response to an incident in which a child had been attacked by a stray dog on the way to 
school. Recognising that the community was growing frustrated and the officers lacked the 
authority to address the problem, the officer explained: 
 
“We went to the meeting and heard their problems. Tomorrow we will meet with our chief. 
He will ask us about it and help us to deal with it. However, if this happened in another 
municipality, the chief or the commander would not make himself available for a meeting. 
[In another sector the RPZ officer] would make promises at the meeting but without support 
they would not be able to show results. This would ultimately mean that the community 
would not respect them or take them seriously.”  (personal communication, RPZ1) 
 
By translating the SDC’s scripts for community policing into culturally accepted roles 
and practices, the officers from RPZ1 made important progress towards validating the model. 
Blaustein encountered further evidence of this during a follow-up interview with RPZ1’s 
Station Commander and a Shift Supervisor. The commander reflected that “for the last 10-15 
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years, the police station has been working to find a way to implement similar strategies, 
aimed at improving public trust in the police” but previous initiatives had failed because they 
emphasised the idea that “every officer should be a [community police] officer” (interview, 
RPZ1 station commander). This sentiment was echoed by the shift supervisor who noted that 
“…in theory, every officer should be a [community police] officer but the reality is that patrol 
officers have too many other responsibilities”. The shift supervisor added that this model of 
community policing “is excellent because it contributes to improved communication with the 
public that serves to enhance trust with the police” (interview, quoting RPZ1 shift 
supervisor).  In this case, managerial support for community policing appeared to reflect the 
officers’ demonstrated success rather than the need for managers to demonstrate their 
compliance with an agenda for change. This analysis is supported by the fact that during the 
time of the research, community policing was not formally recognised by the MUP KS.  
RPZ1’s concerns about the long term sustainability of their progress highlights their 
important, individual contributions to generating support for the model.
xvi
  Responding to the 
question “what happens when you get promoted or when [one of the officers] leaves the 
department”, one of the officers acknowledged “this is a big concern…we have discussed it 
with our chief and he agrees that the success of [community policing in this sector] …is down 
to [us] and the trust [we] have established” (personal communication, RPZ1). This response 
indicates that the social capital accumulated by the officers from RPZ1 allowed them to 
render community police work legitimate in the eyes of their colleagues and supervisors. 
However, it also suggests that lacking a wider mechanism for collective action [(Marks 2000; 
2005)], this progress was not necessarily sustainable. For instance, if the officers were 
promoted or reassigned, the legacy of community policing in their sector would depend at 
least in part on the ability and the willingness of their replacements to use their agency to 
advance a similar agenda.  
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RPZ2 
 
The officers from RPZ2 failed to match the success of their colleagues from RPZ1in terms of 
generating cultural acceptance of CP because they were restricted from exercising their 
mediatory potential. This was due to a combination of contextual obstacles, managerial 
resistance and the officers’ personal insecurities and dismissive attitudes towards community 
police work. The main contextual obstacle affecting the officers from RPZ2 was the fact that 
the unit was based in what the RPZ Coordinator described as ‘the most demanding sector’ in 
the city centre (personal communication, ‘RPZ Coordinator’).xvii The station’s limited budget 
and personnel resources meant that they were frequently redeployed by their sector chief on 
short notice. For example, the officers were regularly required to work protests and assigned 
to security details for international diplomats. The sector chief justified the practice of 
assigning the officers to public order activities by arguing that they were ‘not involved with 
repressive activities’. Rather, he stated that they were ‘used as go-betweens between the 
patrol officers and citizens’ (interview, Sector Chief from RPZ2). The policing I observed at 
a large protest in response to the arrest of former Bosnian General Jovan Divjak in March 
2011 did not appear to be particularly aggressive but such deployments restricted the unit’s 
operational autonomy. This in-turn prevented them from attending local community meetings 
and developing meaningful partnerships. To this effect, one of the officers from RPZ2 
described how “protests are not predictable which means that on days when we are assigned 
to work [them], [we] cannot make other plans because [we] will not know how long [we] are 
there” (personal communication, RPZ2). Reflecting on Herbert’s [(2001: 66)] discussion of 
‘reform as resistance’, this practice can be interpreted as an example of a senior manager 
selectively implementing a community policing reform in a manner that ‘reinforce[s] the 
28 
 
professional/masculinist model’ and ‘resists any seeming feminization of the 
occupation…and the greater potential democratic oversight it implies’.  
Another way that managerial resistance, or perhaps more accurately, indifference, 
prevented the officers from capitalising on their potential as change agents was through 
staffing decisions. One of the officers from RPZ2 noted that when the reform was first 
introduced to Sarajevo Canton, the sector chief failed to take an interest in their work because 
“he was old and looking towards retirement” (personal communication, RPZ2). Thus,  rather 
than recruiting enthusiastic young officers to pilot the initiative, the former Sector Chief 
staffed the unit with two veteran officers who had not volunteered for the post and a junior 
officer whose enthusiasm was overshadowed by the scepticism of senior colleagues. The 
officers from RPZ2 explained that their current Sector Chief appeared to be more supportive 
of their unconventional role than their predecessor. However, my observations
 
(described 
below) and the successor’s inability to articulate the benefits of community policing during a 
follow-up interview indicate that this ‘support’ was primarily rhetorical (interview, Sector 
Chief RPZ2).  
Elsewhere, [Greene’s (2000: 341-342)] research on community policing in 
Philadelphia indicates that enthusiasm is generally an important determinant of whether 
community policing initiatives will be operationally effective.  The practice of staffing 
community policing units with veteran or out-of-favour officers is a form of managerial 
resistance or disinterest that is documented in the Anglo-American community policing 
literature [(for example, Skogan (2008: 24)]. Specifically, [Skogan (2008: 24)] suggests that 
the discretion required for community police work may threaten police managers who view it 
as undermining their ability to exercise hierarchical control over their subordinates. While 
staffing a unit with veteran or disinterested officers may constitute a strategy for harnessing 
discretion, [Skogan and Hartnett’s (1997: 88)] research also suggests that ‘older officers’ 
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involved with the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy were ‘generally less aggressive in 
their policing style’ than young officers. This suggests that veteran officers could 
hypothetically play a positive role in supporting bottom-up reform. In this particular case, the 
lack of ‘aggression’ described by [Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 88)] appeared to manifest 
itself as a lack of enthusiasm rather than a reflective attempt to ‘feminise’ police work. This 
was evident from the officers’ relatively passive and defeatist approach to operationalizing 
the SDC’s model. 
The officers’ passivity was evident from their indifference to the sector’s settled 
Roma population which they described as ‘deviant’ and ‘vulnerable’ (personal 
communications, RPZ2). Instead of proactively working to develop functional partnerships 
with Roma community leaders, the officers maintained their social distance. This reflected 
and reaffirmed an institutionally-entrenched belief of the Sarajevo Canton Police that “[the 
Roma] have their own system and culture which the police do not understand…whenever 
there is a problem, they prefer to handle it themselves” (personal communication, RPZ2). 
Similarly, the officer’s dismissive attitude towards community policing itself was evident 
from their unwillingness to follow-up on a ‘problem’ that was brought to their attention by a 
local community secretary. During what appeared to be an impromptu meeting between the 
officers and the community secretary, the community secretary informed the officers that 
local residents were complaining about the noise from a local café. The secretary stated that 
the issue had previously been brought to the attention of the officers who had not followed up 
with it. This suggestion led to a heated exchange between the officers and the secretary (field 
notes). Following the meeting, one of the officers reflected on the encounter and stated, “this 
is the job of environmental police” (personal communication, RPZ2). The response highlights 
the officer’s continued resistance to an expanded mandate and the types of partnership-
building activities prescribed by the SDC.  
30 
 
Comparing the approaches that each of the units took to implementing the SDC’s 
curriculum for transactional analysis in local schools further highlights the resistance of the 
officers from RPZ2. Whereas the officers from RPZ1 took the lead in administering a series 
of activities that were designed to promote friendly interactions between children and the 
police, the officers from RPZ2 enlisted teachers and school psychologists to administer these 
exercises. Rather than participating in the activities, they observed them and took photos to 
present the RPZ Coordinator and other RPZ units. In one instance, an officer decided to 
excuse themselves from one of these events all together after complaining that it was not a 
good use of police time (field notes).  
This passivity and resistance was partially attributable to a lack of managerial support 
which was itself a product of contextual factors. Equally, it was also attributable to the 
agency of the officers who continued to adhere to entrenched subcultural definitions of police 
work. For example, one of the veteran officers from RPZ2 described how colleagues from the 
‘Intervention Unit’ regularly mocked community policing as “a very easy job” that had little 
to do with policing. Another member of the unit appeared to appreciate the potential benefits 
of partnership-building and the progress demonstrated by their counterparts in RPZ1 but 
feared that they were being negatively perceived by their former rank-and-file partners from 
patrol (personal communications, RPZ2). Whereas the officers from RPZ1 developed 
strategies for promoting collegiality as a means for confronting hostile attitudes in their 
station, the officers from RPZ2 remained protective of their traditional police identity. This 
in-turn limited both their capacity and motivation to assume the role of change agents with 
respect to both the organisation’s culture and the community’s perceptions of the organisation 
and its role in that sector.  
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Conclusion 
 
This article has used a comparative analysis of a multi-site, single case study to account for 
the significance of the agency of rank-and-file officers in supporting ‘bottom-up’ police 
reform in the context of a developing and transitional context. It has described a process of 
cultural transformation that was initiated by motivated and enthusiastic rank-and-file police 
officers from within the police organisation and also considered the factors that restricted 
police officers from replicating this success in another sector.  Reflecting on the difficulties 
experienced by the officers from RPZ2, one of the officers from RPZ1 commented, 
“successes are down to the people and their approach to work [but] the quality of the people 
is the most important thing” (personal communication, RPZ1). The officer added, “[they] 
must fight for this if they really want community policing to succeed” (personal 
communication, quoting RPZ1). The officer was not suggesting that the officers from RPZ2 
were incapable of doing community police work. Rather their point was that the officers from 
RPZ2 failed to exhibit the intrinsic motivation necessary for creatively addressing 
institutional and contextual obstacles. These included the officers’ unwillingness to challenge 
established subcultural definitions of police work, limited managerial support and contextual 
obstacles that constrained the availability of resources.  
By comparison, the experience of the officers from RPZ1 illustrates that the absence 
of institutional and contextual constraints may enable and perhaps even encourage capable 
and motivated rank-and-file officers to assume the role of change agents. It was in relation to 
their ongoing efforts to reconcile their interpretations of the SDC’s model with culturally-
entrenched beliefs and practices that this transformational abilities were evident. Their 
educational status and supportive managers also enabled them to thrive and their interactions 
with colleagues and supervisors represented an important strategy for negotiating recognition 
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of their role within the sector.. Local knowledge and social capital, both out in the community 
and within the police organisation, constituted important resources that enabled the officers to 
perform these tasks. This suggests that while the agency of rank-and-file officers is not in 
itself be sufficient for ensuring the successful implementation of a community policing 
project, it is a necessary prerequisite for doing so.  This agency provides a vehicle for 
institutionalisation vis-à-vis subcultural transformation and the development of a sustainable 
community policing model from the ‘bottom-up’.  
It is worth considering that representatives of international development agencies 
including the SDC in BiH generally lack these cultural resources and thus, the ability to 
negotiate subcultural definitions of police work. They are therefore dependent on institutional 
champions to assume responsibility for the implementation process. This implies that 
reformers should seek to enlist the support of motivated personnel when pursing an ‘early-
riser’ approach to introducing community policing reforms in developing and transitional 
societies. Of course, as Brogden [(2005)] argues, community policing may not constitute an 
appropriate model to begin so questions of cultural and contextual fit need to be taken 
seriously at the design phase of any project if the project is to be a success from the 
perspectives of local stakeholders. The analysis presented in this article does not conclude 
that the SDC’s project in BiH was either a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ but rather, a ‘work in 
progress’. This is perhaps the most accurate label that one might aspire to ascribe to any 
police reform initiative because, to paraphrase one the officers from RPZ1 observed, ‘it can 
work but it takes time’ (personal communication with RPZ1).  
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i The data yield consisted of 30,000 words of field notes including the author’s observations, 
ethnographic interviews with officers from RPZ1 and RPZ2 and personal reflections. 
Interviewees included the station commanders for both units (n=2), members of other 
RPZ units working based in different sectors in the Canton (n=3),the Canton’s 
designated ‘RPZ Coordinator’, a project associate from the SDC and a member of the 
project’s external evaluation team. 
ii I searched English-language scholarly databases and asked fellow researchers from BiH to 
search local academic libraries for any Serbo-Croat resources on policing in the former-
Yugoslavia. The only Serbo-Croat reference that I have located on policing in the former 
Yugoslavia (pre-1991) was an NCJRS Abstract for Anzic, (1992). The abstract indicates 
that the article describes the repressive function of high policing in Yugoslavia but I 
have unable to access the full text.   
iii Prior to liberalisation, public policing was overseen by the Federal Secretariat of the 
Interior. The six constituent republics of the SFRY included the Socialist Republics of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.  
iv
 I encountered anecdotal evidence of this historical aversion to police contact during an 
interview with a senior police officer in Sarajevo. The officer suggested that even today, 
older generations in BiH continue to mistrust the police because they associate sector-
based policing with neighbourhood policing styles of the Yugoslav era (personal 
communication, ‘Station Supervisor’, 04 April 2011). 
v This is not to suggest that an objective benchmark or threshold exists for measuring the 
‘democratic’ character of this institution, rather that it was not intended to be 
‘democratic’ and nor does the limited anecdotal evidence suggest that it was viewed as 
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democratic by citizens of the SFRY or prominent Western political scientists of the era 
like Rummel (1997) who associated the RBD with ‘democide’. 
vi
 A more expansive list of subcultural values that are commonly associated with the rank-and 
file is provided by Fielding (1994: 47):‘(i) aggressive, physical action; (ii) a strong sense 
of competitiveness and preoccupation with the imagery of conflict; (iii) exaggerated 
heterosexual orientations, often articulated in terms of misogynistic and patriarchal 
attitudes towards women; and (iv) the operation of rigid in-group/out-group distinctions 
whose consequences are strongly exclusionary in the case of out groups and strongly 
assertive of loyalty and affinity in the case of in-groups’. This list is for the most part 
consistent with that provided by Reiner (2010) as well as the themes of ‘danger and 
authority’ and ‘masculinity’ which have been identified by Skolnick (1966) and Herbert 
(2001), respectively.  
vii
 The differences between ‘street cop culture’ and ‘management cop culture’ are well 
documented but it is important to consider that there may exist some important 
commonalities between the two. In other words, the subcultural values that are used by 
the rank-and-file officers to construct their role are familiar to management cops who, in 
the vast majority of police organisations, were once themselves rank-and-file officers. 
While their understanding of police work is likely to have changed due to the nature of 
their role, it must be acknowledged that police managers may also prove resistant to 
changes that are perceived to be a threat to the romanticised values.  
viii
 The ten most significant challenges to implementing community policing identified by 
[Mastrofski et al (2007: 227)] include: ‘getting sufficient resources to do CP right’; 
‘’getting the support of rank-and-file officers’; ‘meeting calls for service demands and 
conducting criminal investigations while doing CP’; ‘getting officers to accept a greater 
role for the community in setting police priorities, shaping policies, and assessing 
results’; ‘getting rank-and-file officers to try innovative approaches to problem-solving’; 
‘getting accurate data on the CP performance of officers’; ‘getting middle managers to 
take the initiative of solving problems’; ‘getting the support of middle managers’; 
‘getting officers to accept the importance of dealing with problems that the community 
thinks are most important’; ‘getting officers to take the initiative of solving problems’. 
Further down their list, Mastrofski (2007: 227) identify the four main ‘external’ 
challenges to implementing community policing reforms: ‘overcoming the objections of 
the union when changes are required’; ‘getting the support of the community’; ‘getting 
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cooperation from other organizations’; ‘getting the support of elected/appointed 
officials’.  
ix By contrast, the officers from RPZ2 were assigned to the unit (see ‘RPZ2’). 
x Like RPZ1, this unit was comprised of young, enthusiastic officers who volunteered for the 
RPZ role. Members of this newly established unit shadowed the officers from RPZ1 as 
part of their training which explains why they exhibited similar attitudes about 
implementing the model. 
xi  Previous work by [Pino (2001: 202-203)] describes the emphasis on trust-building in 
community policing as ‘social capital building’.  
xiiResearch by [Wycoff and Skogan (1994)] supports the idea that participatory management 
and operational autonomy can have a significant positive impact on the receptiveness of 
community police officers themselves to change and the extent to which they perceive 
the significance of their work. 
xiiiElsewhere referred to as ‘betting shops’ in the UK.  
xiv Approximately15,000 EUR.  
xv This was confirmed during a follow-up interview with one of the unit’s shift supervisors 
who observed that members of the public who were familiar with community policing 
were more willing to come forward with information to RPZ officers than patrol officers 
because they trusted them to protect their identity (interview, RPZ1 shift supervisor).  
xvi  This study does not sufficiently account for the question of sustainability as this would 
require longitudinal research. As an exploratory study, it does highlight a number of 
potential threats to sustainability including the effects of promotion or retirement of 
highly capable RPZ officers, leadership changes, budgetary constraints and the lack of 
formal recognition for the RPZ role within the MUP KS Regulation of the Job 
Classification document. The latter concern was subsequently addressed by the MUP 
KS and the RPZ role was officially recognised by the Sarajevo Canton Police in July 
2011 [(Pekic 2011)]. 
xvii
 Insofar as the sector was home to numerous international organisations as well as 
government agencies and commercial premises, one might even question whether it 
could even be accurately described as a ‘community’.  
